![]() ![]() What, if anything, do these “knowings” have in common? Traditionally philosophers have sharply distinguished knowings such as Lily’s, that can seemingly be encapsulated and transmitted in propositions (“ knowing-that”), from knowings such as Aroha’s, that seem at least partly held in the body (“ knowing-how”). Intellectualism and its DiscontentsĤLily knows that Canberra is the capital of Australia. Finally, we present our own view of “habit as embodied representation” (section 6), which combines anti-intellectualist insights concerning embodiment found in key phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty with a novel intellectualism to be found in the semiotics of Peirce. Then we examine the current state of debates concerning intellectualism in embodied cognition (section 5), noting the lack of consensus over whether the mind can be said to represent in any sense. We then briefly introduce the field of 4E cognition (section 3), before turning to habit as a supplement to most current 4E approaches and detailing how it is theorized by pragmatism and by phenomenology (section 4). 2 We explore the crucial intellectualist assumption of mindedness as representation. For phenomenology, Husserl’s (.)ģWe begin our argument (section 2) by outlining intellectualism, as a background view that both pragmatism and phenomenology resisted, to some degree forging their own positive outlooks via that resistance. 2 Of course this was by no means the only influence on both traditions.In this way, our work both augments and challenges the Dewey/Merleau-Ponty connection that has already been extensively explored in the field (Gallagher 2017 Godfrey-Smith 2015 Hutto 2011 Menary 2010 Clark 1997). Peirce, as we believe that his semiotics, which analyses sign-use as habit, shows how theorists of embodied cognition can break a certain false dichotomy between embodiment and logical or intellectual structure which is arguably hampering their work. We pay particular attention to the work of classical pragmatist C.S. We shall seek to motivate a habit-based epistemology, as an alternative to the Cartesian idea-based epistemology that has arguably dominated modern philosophy. Although the two traditions contributed significantly to the genealogy of this field, which has been acknowledged (Gallagher 2017 Thompson 2007 Hutto & Myin 2013 Clark 2008a Clark 1997 Chemero 2009), we believe that it can benefit from systematically re-examining its roots in these two traditions taken together, as much of the existing literature has tended to emphasise one or the other.ĢWe shall specifically explore distinctive insights from both traditions regarding the nature and role of habits. 1 In this paper we seek to change this, by exploring some features of pragmatism and phenomenology that enable them to collaborate propitiously in the rapidly developing field of 4E cognition (Shapiro & Spaulding 2021). Yet because the two traditions developed in different geographic locations before today’s globalized academic industry, they have arguably not engaged and learned from one another as much as they might. Both methodologically foreground experience and lived problem-solving in ways that mainstream analytic philosophy generally does not. See in (.)ġPragmatism and phenomenology are two distinct philosophical traditions which show some striking commonalities. 1 Honorable exceptions include work by Sandra Rosenthal, Carl Sachs, Mark Okrent, and others.In this way, our work both augments and challenges the Dewey/Merleau-Ponty connection that has been much more extensively explored by the field. Peirce, arguing that his semiotics, which analyses sign-use as habit, shows how theorists of embodied cognition can break a certain false dichotomy between embodiment and logical or intellectual structure which has prevented them from fully theorising propositional knowledge. We then outline distinctive insights from both traditions regarding the nature and role of habits, in order to put forward a habit-based epistemology as an alternative to the Cartesian idea-based epistemology that has dominated modern philosophy. We begin by exploring pragmatism and phenomenology’s shared focus on contesting intellectualism, and its key assumption of mindedness as representation. As existing 4E cognition literature has tended to emphasise one or the other tradition, issues remain to be addressed concerning their commonalities – and possible incompatibilities. Although pragmatism and phenomenology have both contributed significantly to the genealogy of so-called “4E” – embodied, embedded, enactive and extended – cognition, there is benefit to be had from a systematic comparative study of these roots. ![]()
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